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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court err reversibly in overruling 
Defendant's objection to the Court's sua sponte addition of the 
words "or should have known" to the statutory language (previously 
agreed upon by both court and counsel) of the instruction on the 
elements of the crime of Theft by Receiving? 
Did the trial court err in convicting Manuel Paez when the 
State had failed to prove each element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
MANUEL PAEZ 
Defendant/Appellant 
Ca^e No. 870179-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Manuel Paez for 
one count of Theft by Receiving, a Class A misdemeanor. A jury 
found Mr. Paez guilty at the conclusion of a one-day trial on May 
5th, 1987. On June 8, 1987, Mr. Paez was sentenced to serve 120 
days in jail. The jail was stayed upon Mr. Paez's successful 
completion of one year good behavior prooation. The terms of this 
probation are that Mr. Paez commit no crimes, that he pay $239.00 in 
restitution, and that he pay a $350 fine. This sentence was imposed 
in the Fifth Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, by the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, Judge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of March 28, 2987, Manuel Paez and his wife 
were dinner guests at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Felix Amaguer (T.56) 
In the course of the evening, a person known to Appellant only as 
Felipe, also a dinner guest, approached Mr. Paez asking for a ride 
to Felipe's home (T. 57). Felipe indicated that he wanted to pick 
something up and return with this item to the dinner party (T. 58). 
This conversation was overheard by other guests (T. 59). 
Directed by Felipe, Mr. Paez drove to an apartment building 
located at or near 2809 South 300 East in Salt Lake County, Utah (T. 
59). Mr. Paez waited at the car for Felipe, who returned with a 
video cassette recorder in his arms. 
There is no evidence in the record contradicting Mr. Paez's 
version of the facts up to this point, although the facts of the 
remainder of the incident are disputed. Mr. Paez testified that 
Felipe, pursued by another man, ran to the fence at the back of the 
apartments and threw the video cassette recorder over onto the 
sidewalk before climbing the fence himself and escaping (T. 63). 
Felipe's pursuer also climbed the fence and, frustrated in his 
attempt to restrain Felipe, tried to hit Mr. Paez, who was standing 
near his car (T. 63). Alarmed by what was happening, Mr. Paez got 
into his car and drove back to the Amaguer home (T. 63). 
The version of the facts reported by the State's witnesses 
from the time when Felipe was running toward the fence and Mr. Paez 
was standing near his car on the other side differs from the account 
given by Mr. Paez. Mark Canham testified that he saw Felipe hand 
the video cassette recorder over the fence to Manuel Paez (T. 36, 
37). Mr. Canham testified that he jumped the fence in pursuit of 
Felipe, landing on the hood of Mr. Paez's parked car (T. 37). Mr. 
Paez, who had the VCR in his arms, looked at Mr. Canham, then threw 
the VCR on the ground (T. 37). Mr. Canhaii grabbed Mr. Paez by the 
arm, but Mr. Paez jerked away and escaped in his car (T. 37, 38). 
Mr. Canham was able to get the license pl&te number of the car (T. 
38). 
Manuel Paez was charged by information on April 2, 1987, 
with Theft by Receiving for his involvement in the incident of March 
28, 1987 See Addendum A. 
At the jury trial on May 5, 1987, Manuel Paez and Felix 
Amaguer testified to Appellant's version of the facts as recited 
above. Lori Nicholson and Mark Canham, t-fcp alleged victims of the 
theft, testified further that their home had been burglarized 
earlier in the day on March 28, 1987, and that their video cassette 
recorder had been taken (T. 28,29). 
South Salt Lake City police officer Lee Lindsay verified 
that Nicholson and Canham had reported tlje VCR missing, had reported 
the sighting of Felipe and Manuel Paez, and had reported the license 
number of the car driven by Mr. Paez (T. 51). Officer Lindsay 
testified that he had inquired with the Division of Motor Vehicles 
and learned that the car Mark Canham saw leavinq the scene was 
registered to Manuel Paez (T. 51). 
Before the defendant put on his evidence at trial, the 
court met with respective counsel in chambers to discuss jury 
instructions. Among other things, the court and counsel agreed that 
the jury should be instructed in the language of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-408 (1953 as amended) in regard to intent. See addendum B. 
However, when the court instructed the jury, he 
substantially altered the statutory language on the element of 
intent (T. 71,72). Mr. Paez objected to the modified instruction 
(T. 86,87). His objection was overruled (T 86,87). Both counsel 
argued extensively on the element of intent in closing. This 
controversial instruction gave rise to both of the issues now raised 
by Manuel Paez on appeal. 
On May 5, 1987, a jury convicted Manuel Paez of Theft by 
Receiving, a Class A misdemeanor. On June 8, 1987, the Honorable 
Floyd H. Gowans, Judge in the Fifth Circuit Court, imposed sentence 
on Manuel Paez. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant urges this court to overturn his conviction on 
both or either of two grounds. 
First, Appellant contends that the trial court erred 
reversibly in overruling the defense objection to the court's sua 
sponte addition of the words "or should have known" to the statutory 
language defining the state of mind required for a finding of guilt 
of Theft by Receiving. 
Second, Appellant contends that his conviction should be 
overturned because it rests on insufficient evidence. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
MANUEL PASZ'S CONVICTION OF THEFT BY RECEIVING SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AT TRIAL TO THE COURT'S ADDING 
THE WORDS "OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THE PROPERTY HAD BEEN 
STOLEN" TO THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON THE STATE OF MIND REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION OF 
THEFT BY RECEIVING. 
Manuel Paez was convicted on May 5, 1987, of the crime of 
Theft by Receiving. Mr. Paez contends that the trial court 
incorrectly instructed the jury on the elements of Theft by 
Receiving. This error was prejudicial ana requires reversal of the 
conviction on appeal. 
Mr. Paez prepared and submitted to the trial court proposed 
jury instructions. Among others, Mr. Paelz submitted an instruction 
on the elements of the Theft by Receiving. 
You must acquit the defendant, Manuel Paez, of Theft by 
Receiving unless you find each of the following elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. that on or about March 28, 1987, 
2. in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
3. Manuel Paez received, retained or 
disposed of the property of Lori 
Nicholson; 
4. that Manuel Paez knew the property 
had been stolen or believed it had 
been stolen; 
5. that Manuel Paez ic^eived the property 
with the purpose to deprive Lori 
Nicholson of it; 
6. that the property was worth more than 
$100.00 but less than $250.00. 
See Addendum C, instruction No. 5. (Emphasis added) 
Before the trial court instructed the jury, the court and 
respective counsel discussed proposed instructions in chambers and 
off the record. The court essentially agreed to give defendant's 
proposed Instruction No.5. The court agreed to instruct the jury in 
the language of the statute touching the mental state required for 
the crime (See addendum B ): 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains 
or disposes of the property of another knowing 
that it has been stolen, or believing that it 
probably has been stolen, . . . with a purpose 
to deprive the owner thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended) (Emphasis added). 
However, when the court instructed the jury, he 
substantially altered the statutory specifications as to state of 
mind: 
Before you can convict the defendant, Manuel 
Paez, (of) the crime of Theft by Receiving, a 
Class A disdemeanor, you must find to the 
evidence. First, that on or about the 28th 
day of March, 1987, in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Manuel Paez received the property of another. 
Next, that he did so with the purpose to de-
prive the owner thereof. Next, that he knew 
said property had been stolen or believed 
that said property had been stolen or should 
have known said property had been stolen. Fifth, 
that said property then and there had a value 
of more than $100, but less than $250. 
T. 71, 72. (Emphasis added). 
The trial court's sua sponte addition of the words "or 
should have known said property had been stolen" to the language of 
the statute was error* Defendant objected to the added requirement 
(T. 86,87). The court overruled defendant's objection (T. 86,87). 
The court erred reversibly in overruling this objection because the 
instruction as given was incorrect and the impact of the incorrect 
instruction was indisputably prejudicial. 
The state of mind required for Theft by Receiving is 
clearly set forth in section 76-6-408 and has been reiterated in 
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Enacted in 1973, section 76-6-408 plainly expresses the 
legislative intent that a person be subject to conviction of Theft 
by Receiving only if the facts prove beyorid a 
reasonable doubt that he received property knowing it had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen. The plain 
language of the statute limits the class Of offenders susceptible to 
conviction to those who know or believe probably. By its very 
specificity as to the state of mind, the statute excludes those who 
should have known. 
There is no reason to believe that the plain language of 
section 76-6-408 is not indicative of legislative intent. To the 
contrary, there is every reason to believte that the statute 
expresses the intent of the legislature precisely. Adopted in 1973, 
Section 76-6-408, like most of Utah's cur|rent penal code, is based 
on the Model Penal Code. The comments to the Model Penal Code, 
though not adopted or endorsed by Utah's legislature, are useful in 
interpreting statutes based on MPC antecedents. The comments to 
section 223.6 of the MPC, section 76-6-408's counterpart, indicate 
i 
that Theft by Receiving statutes fall into three categories with 
respect to the state of mind. The first group find guilt to exist 
only when the accused person can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
to have known the property he received was stolen. The second group 
impute guilt when the evidence establishes that the accused knew or 
believed probably that the property was stolen. The third crroup 
imposes liability for negligence, authorizing conviction of the 
accused who should have known the property he received was stolen. 
Model Penal Code §223.6 (1980) at 238,239. 
The comments to the MPC identify Utah's statute as falling 
in the middle group. _id. at 238 Footnote 15. Surely this assessment 
is indisputable. In fact, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
acknowledging MPC section 223.6(1) as the model for section 
76-6-408, has endorsed the MPC view of Utah's position and the MPC 
explanation of the advantages of this position: 
Many state legislatures in adopting the Model 
Penal Code have inserted the adjective "stolen" 
immediately prior to "property of another", thus 
negating the Model Penal Code change and making 
it clear that the property actually must be 
stolen. (References to statutes of other states 
omitted). On the other hand, the Utah 
legislature, in adopting the Model Penal Code did 
not negate the intent of the Code's drafter and 
restrict the statute's coverage to stolen 
property only. The Utah Criminal Code 
Commentary, prepared by Jay V. Barney, 
the reporter for Utah's adaptation and adoption 
of the Model Penal code, recognized the alternate 
mens rea of "believing that it probably has been 
stolen" but is otherwise silent on the 
character of the subject property J.Barney, Utah 
Criminal Code Commentary 187 (1967). We are left, 
then, with the plain working of the statute that 
the actor must only believe the property to be 
stolen and with the legislative intent that the 
property need not be stolen in fact, as 
articulated by Section 223.6 (comment 4(b)). 
State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1170-71 (Utah 1985). 
The reasons for the code drafters' favoring the position 
taken by Utah are not relevant to the issue at hand. The point is 
that Utah's legislature chose one of three clearly defined, 
pre-existing alternative articulations of the state of mind required 
for Theft by Receiving. The trial court should have deferred to the 
legislature in instructing the jury on sta|te of mind in the case at 
bar. The trial court's usurption of the legislative function in 
adding language imposing a negligence standard was improper. The 
court erred in overruling defendant's obiection to the judicially 
amended statutory language. 
Appellant's view of the statutory requirement regarding 
state of mind as elucidated above is suppdrted by numerous Utah 
Supreme Court decisions. In State v. Powell, 672 P.2d 96 (Utah 
1983)/ the defendant appealed his conviction of Theft by Receiving 
on the grounds that the stolen property h^ believed he was receiving 
was not in fact stolen since it was being used in a sting 
operation. The court held that the state of mind requirement was 
met by the actor's actual belief that the property was stolen. The 
state of mind requirement for Theft by Receiving is stated in the 
language of 76-6-408 in State v. Murphy, fel7 P.2d 399-401, (Utah 
1980). See also State v. Hill, 727 P.2d J221-223, (Utah 1986). 
The instruction on the elements of Theft by Receiving given 
to the jury over defendant's objection wais wrong. Appellant urges 
this court to reverse his conviction because the court's error in 
incorrectly instructing the jury over his objection was prejudicial. 
Error is prejudicial and requirels reversal on appeal 
"unless it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would 
have convicted even in the absence of error at the trial level". 
State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz.1983). In assessing whether 
error is reversible, the crucial question is not whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the judgment, but whether the error 
affected the judgment. United States v. Robinson, 544 P.2d 611 (2nd 
Cir. 1976). In State v. Pierre,572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court stressed that a court may reverse a conviction when 
the error at trial is such that: 
there exists a reasonable 
probability or likelihood that there 
would have been a result more 
favorable to the defendant in 
absence of the error. 
Id. at 1352. 
In the case at bar, there is a reasonable probability or 
likelihood that the result would have been more favorable to the 
defendant had the jury been properly instructed on the elements of 
the crime charged. 
It is not possible that the jury ignored or was 
uninfluenced by the court's incorrect instruction that a negligence 
standard could be applied in establishing a guilty state of mind. 
It is not possible, because both counsel argued this issue to the 
jury. The state's argument on this element was extensive and 
explicit: 
(A)nother thing that Ms. Christianson 
said I would like to correct. She 
indicated to you that one of the 
standards in one of the elements is 
that he knew the item was stolen or 
believed it was stolen, but the third 
one is that she did not recite to you 
from the same instruction 'or should 
have known that it was stolen'. So 
you go one step beyond what she 
talked about, so when you read that 
instruction, you will find the fact 
that it says 'should have known'. 
Not that he just may have believed it 
to be stolen. But would reasonable 
men know or should they have known 
that someone is coming over with a VCR over the fence in 
the back yard or some other individual, should they have 
known it was stolen, certainly that was the case. 
T. 83-84. 
This argument demonstrates that the application of a 
negligence standard in finding the state of mind required for the 
crime was essential to the State's case. This is born out by the 
facts. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State's position, 
the facts tending to show that Mr. Paez knew, believed probably, or 
should have known the property was stolen, are that Manuel Paez was 
standing on the other side of the fence from the Nicholson-Canham 
residence, that he took the VCR from Felipe over the fence, that he 
dropped it on the ground, and the he drove away in his car. Had 
the jury been properly instructed, they may have found, based on the 
facts, that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Manuel Paez 
knew or believed probably that the VCR was stolen. There is a 
reasonable likelihood that they convicted Mr. Paez only because the 
felt he should have known the VCR was stolen. 
In addition to the reasonable likelihood of the jury's 
having convicted Mr. Paez on the basis of the court's incorrect 
instruction on the elements of the crime, defendant's ability to 
defend against the charge at trial was significantly impaired by the 
court's erroneous instruction. 
Manuel Paez was charged by information with Theft by 
Receiving. The information, couched in the language of 76-6-408, 
notified Mr. Paez that he was accused of receiving property "knowing 
that the property had been stolen or believing that it had probably 
been stolen". See Addendum A. The information was never amended to 
notify Mr. Paez that a negligence standard would apply. Neither did 
the state or the court suggest application of such a standard at any 
time before the court instructed the jury on the record on the 
elements of the crime. Manuel Paez was consequently denied the 
privilege of defending against the crime of which the jury convicted 
him. 
The trial court incorrectly, and over defendant's 
objection, instructed the jury that the state of mind element for 
Theft by Receiving includes the negligence standard expressed by the 
phrase "or should have known the property was stolen." This error 
requires reversal of the conviction because "there exists a 
reasonable probability or likelihood that there would have been a 
result more favorable t the defendant in absence of the error." 
Pierre at 1352. 
POINT II. 
MANUEL PAEZ'S CONVICTION OF THEFT BY 
RECEIVING SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE PROVING 
EACH ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The jury in the case at bar found Manuel Paez guilty of 
Theft by Receiving. In order to warrant such a verdict and make it 
invulnerable on appeal, the State has the burden of proving each 
element of the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Specifically, the prosecution had to satisfy section 76-6-408 (1) by 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Manuel Paez received, 
retained, or disposed of the property of Lori Nicholson; that he 
knew the property had been stolen or believed it had probably been 
stolen; that he received the property intending to deprive Lori 
Nicholson of it; and that the property was worth between $100,00 and 
$250.00, 
In Utah, a court reviewing a conviction supported by 
allegedly insufficient evidence will not usurp the duties of the 
fact-finder. State v. Moon, 688 P.2d 494, 495 (Utah 1984). This 
means the reviewing court will not ordinarily weigh conflicting 
evidence or judge the credibility of testimony. State v. Logan, 563 
P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977). The mere existence of contradictory 
evidence or of conflicting inferences cannot justify disturbance of 
the verdict. State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). 
However, the reviewing court can and must overturn a jury verdict 
for insufficiency of the evidence when the evidence is: "so 
inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime charged." State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). See 
also State v. Fort, P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1977); State v. Wilson, 
565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977); State v. Larsen, 606 P.2d 229, 231 
(Utah 1980) . 
In reviewing a conviction, the appellate court must 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750,751 (Utah 1977). The 
appellate court must find that the jury had sufficient competent, 
credible evidence as to each element of the crime to convince a 
reasonable person beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's 
guilt. Id. inadequate evidence as to any element of the crime 
mandates reversal. State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980). 
When a defendant is convicted on circumstantial evidence, the 
evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the 
guilt of the defendant. State v.Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,232 (Utah 1980); 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). If the evidence is 
insufficient as to any element of the crime, "notwithstanding the 
deference due the judgment of the trial court," the appellate court 
must reverse the conviction. State in the interest of J.S.H., 642 
P.2d 386 (Utah 1982). See also State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 
1240 (Utah 1980); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 447 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980). 
Appellant in the case at bar contends that the State 
presented insufficient evidence to establish the following beyond a 
reasonable doubt: first, that he knew the property had been stolen 
or believed it had probably been stolen; and second, that he 
received the property intending to deprive Lori Nicholson of it. 
The State did not present any direct evidence to prove that Mr. Paez 
knew or believed probably that the VCR was stolen; Viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State's position, the evidence is that 
Mr. Paez took the VCR over the fence from Felipe, that he dropped it 
on the ground, and that he left in his car. This evidence could not 
convince reasonable minds beyond a reasonable doubt that Manuel Paez 
knew the VCR was stolen at the time that he received it. 
Precisely the same evidence is offered to prove that Mr. 
Paez intended to deprive Lori Nicholson of the property. This 
evidence simply cannot reasonably be interpreted as establishing 
that intent. 
The Utah Supreme Court commented on the element of intent 
in State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980): 
We recognize proof of a defendant's intent is rarely 
susceptible of direct proof and therefore, the prose-
cution must rely on a combination of direct and 
circumstantial evidence to establish this element. 
However/ criminal convictions may not be based upon 
conjectures or probabilities and before we can up-
hold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum 
of evidence concerning each element of the crime as 
charged from which the jury may base its conclusion 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citations omitted). 
Murphy at 402. 
In Murphy, the Utah Supreme Court refused to indulge the 
jury's inference of intent to deprive an owner of possession of his 
property from evidence that Mr. Murphy received property from 
another knowing or believing at the time of receipt that it was 
stolen, i^d at 403. The Court found that Mr. Murphy should have 
been acquitted as a matter of law because the essential element of 
intent was not proved. 
Intent is most credibly inferred from direct evidence of 
what a defendant said and did. State v. Canfield, 422 P.2d 196, 198 
(Utah 1967). Intent may also be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence. State v. Cooly, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979). In the 
case of State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594, 598 (Utah 1980), for 
example, the State Supreme Court upheld an inference of defendant's 
intent to arouse the sexual desires of the men he brought home to 
his wife from the fact that he forced her to have sex with them; the 
intent to arouse and gratify his own sexual desires was properly 
inferred from the fact that he listened to recordings of these 
forced sexual encounters "over and over again." 
Id. 
In the present case, the evidence of knowledge or belief 
that the property was stolen and of intent to deprive the owner does 
not amount to the quantum required to support the jury's verdict of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant urges the appellate 
court to reverse his conviction on this basis. 
CONCLUSION 
On either or both of the grounds discussed above, Appellant 
seeks reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to the 
circuit court with an order for either dismissal of the charges or a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this U day of November, 1987. 
o 
t < ^ Q U ? T - U C 
McCaye Christianson 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, MC CAYE CHRISTIANSON,hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Appellant's brief will be delivered to the County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, 
this b day of November, 1987. 
MC CAYE* CHRISTIANSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
Delivered by this day of 
November, 1987. 
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County Attorney 
THOMAS P. VUYK 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MANUEL PAEZ DOB 0 6 / 1 7 / 4 4 , 
Defendant(s). 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Screened by: T. Vuyk 
Assigned to: T. Vuyk 
BAIL $1,500.00 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 
/0O£?/5MS 
The undersigned L. Lindsay - South SLPD under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of: 
BY RECEIVING, a Class A 
in Salt Lake County, 
1987, in violation of 
Code Annotated 1953, 
MANUEL PAEZ, a party 
COUNT I 
THEFT Misdemeanor, at 2809 South 300 East, 
State of Utah, on or about March 28, 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah 
as amended, in that the defendant, 
to the offense, received, retained, or 
disposed of the property of Lori Nocholson, knowing that the 
property had been stolen or believing that it probably had 
been stolen, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, 
and that the value of said property was more than $100.00, 
but did not exceed $250.00; 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Dan Barrett Lee Lindsay Lori Nicholson Mark Canham 
(Continued on page Two) 
INFORMATION 
STATE v. MANUEL PAEZ 
County Attorney #87-1-72279 
Page Two 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Complaining officer bases this Information on police report 
#87-3291 and personal interviews with Lori Nicholson who stated that 
her apartment was broken into and her V.C.R. having a value of 
$200.00 was stolen. Mark Canhara who stated he viewed the defendant 
being handed the V.C.R. over the fence by an unidentified man. When 
Mr. Canham tried to apprehend the defendant he fled in his vehicle. 
Mr. Canham got the license number and made a positive identification 
of the defendant. 
ADDENDUM B 
A F F I D A V I T 
THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. I have been an Manuel Paez's attorney throughout the 
legal proceedings in the Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals in 
case number 870279CA; 
2. In the course of the trial of this case on May 5, 
1987/ the court and respective counsel discussed proposed jury 
instructions in chambers and without a reporter present; 
3. In that conversation, the court explicitly stated that 
he would instruct the jury that one element of the crime of Theft by 
Receiving is that the actor have received property knowing that the 
property had been stolen or believing that it had probably been 
stolen. 
4. When I objected to the modified version of this 
instruction which the court gave to the jury, he overruled my 
objection and told me to wait to put it on the record at the 
conclusion of the trial. This practice is known as "reserving 
objections to jury instructions" and is common in Circuit Court 
proceedings. 
DATED this *3) day of November, 1987. 
r\c To„. ~ C 0 — ^ ^  ^ ° ^ — " 
MCCAYE ICHRfSTIANSON 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J2 day of 
November, 1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
ADDENDUM C 
MCCAYE CHRISTIANSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
: INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
Plaintiff 
v. : 
MANUEL PAEZ, : Case No. 871002815MS 
Defendant 
The defendant, MANUEL PAEZ, by and through his attorney of 
record, MCCAYE CHRISTIANSON, hereby requests this Court in its 
charge to the jury to submit Instruction Nos. 1 through 
inclusive, 
DATED this £ day of May, 1987. 
n. / ^ ^ io^r MCCAYE CHRISTIANSON 
flu^c ^ o W > c Attorney for Defendant 
RECEIVED a copy of the foregoing Instructions to the Jury 
this day of April, 1987. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
You must acquit the defendant, Manuel Paez, of Theft by 
Receiving unless you find each of the following elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. that on or about March 28, 1987, 
2. In Salt Lake County, Utah; 
3. Manuel Paez received, retained, or disposed of the 
property of Manuel- Fa^ -a; 
4. That Manuel Paez knew the property had been stolen or 
that he believed it had probably been stolen; 
5. That Manuel Paez received the property with the purpose 
to deprive Lori Nicholson of it; 
6. That the property was worth more than $100.00 but less 
than $250.00. 
